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This paper investigates how far the post-crisis global economy has 
navigated towards a new phase of capitalism. This question is underpinned 
by a conjecture: capitalism, as a dynamic and flexible economic system, has 
in its crises a key element for its long-term dynamics. The paper is organized 
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Este artigo investiga até que ponto a economia global pós-crise navegou 
rumo a uma nova fase do capitalismo. Uma conjectura sustenta essa 
questão: o capitalismo, como sistema econômico dinâmico e flexível, tem 
nas crises um elemento-chave para a sua dinâmica de longo prazo. O artigo 
está organizado em quatro seções. A primeira examina a literatura sobre o 
papel das crises nas metamorfoses do capitalismo. A segunda seção 
resume a operação de salvamento e os movimentos no epicentro da crise. A 
terceira seção discute se reformas estruturais do capitalismo estão na 
agenda política atual. A quarta seção avalia o estágio da transição em curso 
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The crisis of 2007-08 hit a global economy with very peculiar features: a 
mixed economy (PIKETTY, 2013, p. 483; TAMMING..., 2011), with unseen 
levels of internationalization (WOOD, 2003). The nature of this global 
economy defined much of the answer to the crisis and the rescue operation 
organized to contain its spread. 
Given this starting point, the question addressed by this paper is how 
far the post-crisis global economy has navigated towards a new phase of 
capitalism. This question is underpinned by a conjecture: capitalism, as a 
dynamic and flexible economic system, has in its crises a key element for its 
long-term dynamics. The emergence of crises, their development, the rescue 
operations that they provoke and the structural reforms that they might 
trigger reshape capitalism and open new phases in the history of economy. 
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Crises, therefore, are part of a broader process that can open transitions to 
new phases of capitalism. Hence, this paper surveys available literature to 
investigate clues on a transition towards a new phase of capitalism. 
This interpretation of the role of crises in the long-term dynamics of 
capitalism organizes this study. Two specific questions are asked. First, how 
did reactions to the crisis change its epicenter? Second: are there structural 
reforms already implemented or in the agenda? 
These two questions and their tentative answers — analytical steps in 
the review of literature — are threads that might be integrated to ask a 
further question: how far has the capitalist system navigated, since the crisis, 
towards a new phase? The stage of this transition may help the 
understanding of features of contemporary conjuncture. 
The paper is organized in four sections. The first surveys the literature 
to provide a theoretical and historical background for the study — crises and 
metamorphoses of capitalism. The following sections present the analytical 
steps: the second section summarizes the rescue operation and movements 
in the crisis’ epicenter, and the third section looks into structural reforms. The 
fourth section presents some final remarks.  
 
1 Crises and metamorphoses of capitalism 
 
Crises are moments of adjustment for capitalism. They are part of the 
capitalist dynamics, as they grow out of the inner system’s logic as a 
rebalancing tool — a costly rebalancing tool, in social, human and economic 
terms, but a very effective restructuring tool. The creation of institutional 
mismatches is part of the capitalist dynamics — mismatches that grow out of 
its technological dynamics, source of unequal development with other 
dimensions of the system, such as finance, state, and geopolitical 
arrangements. Crises are at the pinnacle of those institutional mismatches. 
There are institutional responses to crises. In the beginning — during 
and after the initial panic — there are rescue operations. Even those rescue 
operations already trigger changes in the system — unintended or 
unplanned changes. Over time, sometimes as a consequence of limitations 
of the initial rescue operations, sometimes as a consequence of institutional 
and political learning, structural reforms might be introduced to deal with 
previous institutional mismatches. Those combined institutional answers — 
part unintended and unintentional, part unplanned and part politically 
designed — reshape capitalism: a new phase arises. Those changes involve 
both the emergence of new “varieties of capitalism” and broad geographical 
movements of capital — therefore, the economic decay of one country or 
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region, even of a leading country, might not be a system breakdown; on the 
contrary, it might be an expression of capitalist flexibility.1 
The best example of this process can be seen in the crisis of 1929 (and 
its sequence in 1937) and the New Deal reforms that began in 1933 and 
went on until the Second World War — those reforms transformed the U.S. 
economy and later were at least key references for post-war reforms in 
Europe (with the Marshall Plan) and Japan (with the economic policies of 
Occupation) —, which contributed to reshape advanced capitalist economies 
(CALLINICOS, 2009, p. 170-171; PANITCH; GINDIN, 2012). 
It is necessary to investigate a specific source of institutional mismatch 
that may have underpinned the last crises, known as the first global financial 
crisis (BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2009): the 
internationalization drive of capital. This dynamics of internationalization has 
deep connections with the financial dimension, very important as a source of 
the crisis of 2007-08. The globalization of finance is an important drive of the 
internationalization of capital in general. The movements of this 
internationalization of finance may be followed in Panitch and Gindin 
elaboration of “the making of global capitalism”: they articulate three 
movements: “internationalizing production” (PANITCH; GINDIN, 2012, p. 
112), “internationalizing finance” (PANITCH; GINDIN, 2012, p. 117) and 
“detaching from Bretton Woods” (PANITCH; GINDIN, 2012, p. 122). Those 
movements organize a “new international financial architecture” (PANITCH; 
GINDIN, 2012, p. 279). As The Economist (THE GATED…, 2013, online) 
puts forward, “[…] [f]inance, the sector that globalised the most in the years 
leading up to the crisis.” 
A special source for the 2007-08 crises is the step forward that 
capitalism has taken to become more international, more global. The 
inherent drive of capital towards expansion (MARX, 1984) takes place with 
complex institutional arrangements that have states — specially national 
state(s) of leading capitalist nation(s) — connected to (or organizing) this 
overall capitalist expansion logic (PANITCH; GINDIN, 2012, p. 1-3). Panitch 
and Gindin (2012, p. 1-2) stress that capitalist expansion through the world is 
not an automatic process and that it needs states to happen — their book 
describes how the American state and its internationalization led the last 
globalization process. A corollary to this important interpretation might be 
that the eventual exhaustion of the economic, political, and hegemonic 
strengths of leading capitalist state(s) limit the scale and scope of 
                                                     
1
 Rosdolsky (1959, p. 216-218) stresses how important it would have been in the 1910s to 
differentiate the exhaustion of European bourgeoisie from the ascending energy of the U.S. 
in the world scenario. Probably even Lenin underestimated the stage of changing leadership 
in international affairs.  
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international expansion. The British state led a round of capitalist expansion 
which, once exhausted, was replaced by the United States. Now, the 
possible exhaustion of the United States might have opened both a crisis 
and a call for a new arrangement to go ahead with a new round of global 
expansion of capital.2 Probably, both the United Kingdom and the United 
States unleashed economic and political forces that later surpassed their 
resources and energy to deal with — capitalism engulfed larger parts of the 
world, with more complex political and economic problems, with more actors 
and possibilities of alliances. 
This logic of capitalist expansion has to be evaluated in historical 
perspective. Interpreters of capitalism, investigating the system at different 
stages of historical evolution, may have highlighted key structural features of 
this specific dynamics: Marx (1984) unveiled the origin and the start of this 
basic dynamics of expansion; Rosa Luxemburg (1912) and Bukharin (1915) 
described this dynamics in a different framework, pointing to a global drive to 
include non-capitalist regions in the systemic logic; Grossmann (1929) 
evaluated the role of international expansion as a key countertendency to 
the fall of the rate of profit within the framework of classical imperialism; 
Hymer (1978) introduced the investigation of a new agent for this expansion, 
the transnational corporation; and Panitch and Gindin (2012) stressed the 
specific role of the American state for the last round of globalization. 
Certainly, the level of internationalization of capital is one key component to 
define the phases of capitalism — and this suggests a dialogue between 
interpretations focused on the international expansion of capital and other 
periodizations of capitalism. 
This dialogue is important because the logic of expansion of capital 
might have a very specific dynamics, with specific timing and logic that need 
to be investigated. This dynamics might combine phases of pure and 
energetic expansion followed by phases that may be pauses in previous 
expansion drive given the exhaustion of those expansionary energies — 
breathing space for resuming further expansion. There is a literature on 
“waves of globalization”, both in academic (BALDWIN; MARTIN, 1999) and 
in specialized publications (THE GATED…, 2013),3 which could help to 
understand this specific dynamics. Those “waves of globalization” may be 
connected to other long-term interpretations of capitalism, since each   
                                                     
2
 Panitch and Gindin (2012, p. 2) do not evaluate the U.S. leadership as exhausted. On the 
contrary, they stress that after the crisis of 2007 there is an “interstate commitment” in “[…] 
cooperation with the American state in containing the crisis so as to keep capitalist 
globalization going”.  
3
 According to The Economist, “[…] the forward march of globalization has paused since the 
financial crisis” (THE GATED…, 2013). 
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phase — and each “wave of globalization” — may be connected, for 
instance, with specific features of long waves of capitalist development. 
Freeman and Soete (1997, p. 120-125), in a scheme of summing the five 
long waves, suggest how different types of firm are articulated with different 
phases of capitalism. In their scheme, the leading firms of the fourth long 
wave — 1945-91 — are transnational corporations. Other schemes — even 
though slightly simplistic — help to visualize how internationalization of 
capital changes over time, from exports of commodities, to exports of capital, 
as suggested by the literature on classical imperialism (BUKHARIN, 1915; 
HILFERDING, 1910). Certainly, in the post-war period transnational 
corporations (TNCs) became key drivers of internationalization (HYMER, 
1978), a role that has increased over time — pushed by other revolutionary 
changes, such as the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
which opened a new long wave (FREEMAN; LOUÇÃ, 2001) — and that 
have multifarious impacts on other institutions of society (CANTWELL, 
2009). The growing role of TNCs in the global economy is a key source of 
institutional mismatches. And this probably opens an important topic for the 
structural changes necessary to reshape capitalism — the international 
dimension has a greater importance than earlier systemic reconfigurations.  
This enlarged role of the international dimension, therefore, might be 
perceived throughout the stages of the sequence crises-rescue operation-    
-structural reforms-new phase. 
 
2 Post-crisis measures: uneven impact, 
uneven recovery  
 
The effects of an “unprecedented” government intervention (BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2009, p. 16) can be initially evaluated by 
following the ups and downs of market capitalization — a statistical indicator 
of one key component of fictitious capital (see WORLD FEDERATION OF 
EXCHANGES, 2013, 2014). In 2007, the global equity market capitalization 
reached a historic peak: US$60.8 trillion — a result of what Brenner (2006, 
p. 293) calls “stock market Keynesianism”. The initial impact of the crisis was 
huge because, at the end of 2008, this had dropped to US$32.5 trillion. State 
interventions on financial and monetary markets did contain this destruction 
of fictitious capital, pulling global market capitalization to US$47.7 trillion at 
the end of 2009 and to US$54.9 trillion at the end of 2010. The recovery 
problems of the global economy in 2011 were reflected in the decrease to 
US$47.4 trillion at the end of 2011 (WORLD FEDERATION OF 
EXCHANGES, 2011, p. 50). During the following year a recovery was 
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observed, which reached US$54.6 trillion at the end of 2012 (WORLD 
FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, 2013, p. 1) and US$68.7 trillion at the end 
of the first half of 2014 (WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, 2014, p. 
5). This recovery of the levels of market capitalization is an indicator of the 
recomposition of the financial architecture that prevailed before the crisis. 
The geographical breakdown of data from the World Federation of 
Exchanges allows identification of ongoing structural changes in global 
capitalism. In 2000, the market capitalization of the exchanges of the 
Americas was more than three times the capitalization of the Asia-Pacific 
region, which in turn was approximately half the capitalization of the Europe-
-Middle East-Africa. During the crisis in 2008, the market capitalization of the 
Asia-Pacific reached the level of Europe-Middle East-Africa. From 2008, the 
Asia-Pacific region was consolidated in the second position (WORLD 
FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, 2011, p. 50). At the end of the first half of 
2014, the market capitalization of Asia-Pacific totaled US$19.4 trillion, 
compared with US$18.8 trillion for Europe-Middle East-Africa (WORLD 
FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, 2014, p. 5). It is also noteworthy that the 
Americas region, with US$30.4 trillion, is far from being three times the 
market capitalization of the Asia-Pacific as in 2000. 
The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) reports underscore the 
uneven nature of the impact of the crisis and calls the economic recovery 
(BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2010, p. 24) a “two-speed 
recovery,” source of destabilization of balance of payments and volatility in 
capital flows (BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2012, p. 1). 
The differentiation between the rhythms of advanced and emerging 
economies persists before, during and after the crisis: the emerging 
economies obtained higher growth rates until 2007, the decline in these 
rates was lower in emerging economies in 2008 and they returned to pre-
crisis level more quickly (BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 
2013, p. 6). The biggest difference is the data on unemployment: 
unemployment rates were similar until the crisis in 2008; after the crisis, 
there was a gap in these rates from 2009 — in 2012 the unemployment rate 
in advanced countries reached more than 8%, while in emerging countries it 
reached nearly 5% — a level below the pre-crisis rate (BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2013, p. 6).  
Reports of the International Labor Organization (2013, p. 1) also 
highlight this differentiation of rhythms:  
[…] [f]ive years after the global financial crisis, the global 
employment situation remains uneven, with emerging and 
developing Economies recovering much faster than the majority 
of advanced economies. 
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This “two-speed recovery” is also reflected in an important variable for 
an investigation of the reconfiguration of global capitalism: the flows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) — an indicator of the movement of 
internationalization of production. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), these flows are 
sensitive to the dynamics of crisis — while the world’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fell 2.1% in 2009, global FDI inflows fell 33.0% (2013, p. 2). 
In 2007, global FDI flows reached $2 trillion, falling in 2009 to $1.2 trillion 
(UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
2013, p. 213). The UNCTAD report states a regularity between the 
vicissitudes of global FDI: the increased participation of developing countries 
and economies in transition vis-à-vis the developed economies. Developed 
economies in 2000 were the source of 88% of global FDI, while in 2012 their 
global share fell to 65% (UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT, 2013, p. 4). 
However, in the 2015 Annual Report, the BIS identifies a new 
conjuncture: “Output growth was not far away from historical averages; and 
advanced economies (AEs) were gaining momentum even as EMEs had lost 
some” (BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2015, p. 9). In early 
2016, the slowdown in China got the headlines: for instance, a comment 
from the Financial Times (EMERGING…, 2016, online) mentions problems 
with “[…] risky assets amid a slowdown in China and collapsing oil prices.” 
This is an indication of current changes, as problems in China affect the 
whole global economy — and an indication of a new move of the epicenter 
of global problems. 
A final question for this section: is the interplay between the crisis, the 
rescue operation and other post-crisis measures accelerating a transition to 
a new phase of global capitalism? How does this interplay contribute to 
shape a new phase? 
It could be possible to hint the following transformations: (a) an 
expansion in the role and functions of the state — illustrated by The 
Economist (TAMING…, 2011, p. 3) and its diagnosis of a return, by 
accident or intentionally, of “state capitalism”; (b) the “two-speed recovery” 
(BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2012, p. 1) implies the 
transfer of more economic power to the East; (c) the increasing 
internationalization of economic activities (internationalization of capital may 
be the most important single change, a sort of “dominant phenomenon”), 
especially in the global financial system, leading to concerns with a global 
institutional mismatch between the reality and the dynamics of the global 
economy and the weakness — or lack — of global governance — a key 
institutional mismatch that seems to have grown after the crisis; (d) the 
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emergence of new social movements, driven by issues directly or indirectly 
caused by the crisis and the rescue operation. 
 
3 The timing of structural reforms 
  
Section 2 concludes with an evaluation of how the post-crisis measures 
unintentionally have changed global capitalism so far. This section 
investigates the intentional side of changes, investigating evidences of 
structural reforms in the global agenda. 
It is interesting to begin these reflections with the two questions that 
Oliver Blanchard puts forward to Ben Bernanke, Stanley Fischer, Lawrence 
Summers and Kenneth Rogoff in the 2013 International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Annual Research Conference: “what lessons we have drawn from the 
crisis?” and “are we ready for the next one?” (JAQUES POLLACK ANNUAL 
RESEARCH CONFERENCE, 2013). 
One initial point is related to the capability of the U.S. to go on as an 
international crisis firefighter — as Panitch and Gindin (2012) point as an 
evidence as a continuity of the U.S. hegemony. A tentative answer to this 
may be a difference between U.S. resources to contain a crisis in Mexico, 
Turkey, Brazil or South Korea and their resources to contain a crisis in China 
or India. If the U.S. has limitations to contain an eventual crisis of such 
proportion, this might suggest both the rise of new actors large enough to 
impact global economy in different ways and the limits of the U.S. to deal 
with those new actors and related problems.  By the way, even in the last 
crisis (2007-08), the U.S. alone could not contain it — remember the 8 
October 2008 international coordinated action between the Federal Reserve 
(FED), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BofE), the 
Bank of Japan (BofJ) and even the Bank of China (BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2009). The U.S. coordinated the rescue 
operation, but it could not deal with it alone. This problem is present in the 
agenda of the IMF Conference: Bernanke quotes Fischer (1999) — a paper 
that elaborates “on the need for an international lender of last resort”, while 
evaluating the limits that the IMF has to perform this function. Implicitly, there 
might be an evaluation of the limits that the U.S. would have to perform 
alone this role of “international lender of last resource”. According to Fischer 
(1999, p. 95),  
[…] critics of international capital mobility are correct to this 
extent: its potential economic benefit can only be realized if the 
frequency and scale of financial crises can be reduced.  
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Therefore, there is the need to internationalize the role of lender of last 
resort, as Bagehot points out for national spaces (FISCHER, 1999, p. 101): 
certainly not an easy institutional formation process. The lack of such 
institution in 2014 is a sign of the lack of structural reforms to deal with the 
post-crisis environment.  
Seven years after the beginning of the crisis, it is possible to summarize 
the main evaluations as pointing to a conjuncture in which the crisis has 
been contained but not yet overcome. As the BIS puts forward, “[…] the 
overall impression is that the global economy is healing but remains 
unbalanced” (BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2014, p. 10), 
the “[…] longer-term outlook is far from bright” (BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2014, p. 8) and the global economy is 
still in “search of a new compass” — the title of the first chapter of the 2014 
Annual Report (p. 7). 
Reports, prepared by the specialized press and by mainstream 
institutions and organizations, have been focusing on post-crisis problems, 
and they seem to concur in identifying a future that is “bleak” — an adjective 
used by The Economist in a review of Kissinger’s book (A BIT…, 2014, p. 
80). Martin Wolf (2014a, p. 325) writes that “[…] [i]t is easy to believe that the 
scale of current rescue operation might lead to bigger crises down the road, 
as critics argue.” Lawrence Summers may also help to form a diagnosis of 
the predominant feeling among important institutions. Summers (2014, p. 11) 
has resurrected the concept of “secular stagnation.” According to him, “[…] 
in response to the observation that five years after financial hemorrhaging 
had been staunched, the business cycle was beneath what was thought as 
normal levels of output.” Among the arguments listed in a short article, 
Summers cites Robert Gordon’s papers on the “innovation slowdown.” 
Streeck (2014, p. 56) remarks, “[…] [s]ix years after Lehman, predictions of 
long-lasting economic stagnation are en vogue”, and R. Gordon would be a 
“prominent example.”4 
The list of diagnoses gives an idea of the general feeling of those 
analysts: “in search of a new compass,” “secular stagnation,” “innovation 
slowdown,” “bigger crises down the road.” 
Each of those evaluations may be read as pointing to a specific feature 
of the post-crisis phase. 
Martin Wolf (2014a) presents a well-informed evaluation of the crisis, 
the shifts prior to its emergence and the post-crisis management. It is well-   
                                                     
4
 Streeck (2014) may be read, also, as an evaluation of a specific variety of capitalism, 
probably an analysis that involve a broader institutional scenario — something that could be 
called “Western advanced capitalism.” Therefore, Streeck, in his very fine paper, discusses 
not the “end of capitalism,” but the end of the leading role of a set of “varieties of capitalism.” 
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-informed, because it incorporates Minsky’s lessons on financial instability 
(WOLF, 2014a, p. 218), Piketty’s investigation on rising inequality (WOLF, 
2014a, p. 336), Stiglitz’s comments on unemployment, inequality and 
problems in aggregate demand (WOLF, 2014a, p. 277), R. Gordon’s 
“slowdown in growth” (WOLF, 2014a, p. 275) and Mazzucato on the role of 
the state in Research and Development (R&D) activities (WOLF, 2014a, p. 
276). In his analysis, the crisis was a result of financial fragility (WOLF, 
2014a, chapter 4) and of shifts in the world economy (WOLF, 2014a, chapter 
5). At least three major post-crisis changes have taken place in the global 
economy, some as result of the rescue operation to contain it. First, for Wolf 
(2014a, p. 8-9) “[…] the most obvious of all changes is the transformation of 
the financial system. The crisis established the dependence of the world's 
most significant institutions on government support.” Wolf highlights the 
importance of the G7 Ministerial Meeting on 10 October 2008, a “turning 
point,” “[…] not just in the crisis, but also in the broader relationship between 
state and market” (WOLF, 2014a, p. 28). Second,  
[…] [t]hese crises also accelerated a transition in economic 
power and influence that was already under way [...] It is 
plausible that China’s economy already is the biggest in the 
world [...] The crisis has accelerated the world economy 
towards this profound transition (WOLF, 2014a, p. 9-10). 
Wolf highlights two points related to this transition: the “rise of China” 
explains “global imbalances” that helped to “cause the crises” and “[…] 
transitions in global power are always fraught with geo-political and geo-       
-economic peril” (WOLF, 2014a, p. 10). Third, “[…] the crises have 
generated, in addition, fundamental challenges to the operation of the global 
economy,” inter alia, problems related to the “recycling of current account 
surpluses” (WOLF, 2014a, p. 10).  Those background points in Wolf’s view 
lead him to analyze critically both the actions of leading national and 
international institutions during and after the crisis, describing the “crisis 
mismanagement” and “post-crisis mismanagement” (WOLF, 2014a, p. 324). 
Those actions, in his analysis, are very insufficient to deal with the current 
situation and Wolf presents arguments for action and states “[…] that radical 
reform must be on the agenda” (WOLF, 2014a, p. 288).5 Since Martin Wolf is 
a well-informed analyst, for the purposes of this paper his book may be read 
as a diagnosis of the lack of structural reforms necessary to deal with the 
post-crisis environment. This lack of structural reforms leads Wolf to reiterate 
a scenario with crises in the near future (WOLF, 2014a, p. 288, 324, 325).6 
                                                     
5
 In a Financial Times article, Wolf (2014, p. 11) makes a “call to arms,” suggesting that 
“more radical action is needed.” 
6
 The reviewer for The Economist writes that one of the flaws of Wolf’s book is that “[…] he 
spends too little time explaining his reform proposals” (HOW …, 2014). 
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The book concludes with a discussion on the failures of “Western elites” 
(WOLF, 2014a, p. 351). 
This is the main subject of Henry Kissinger (2014), certainly a well-        
-informed analyst. A connection with R. Gordon’s analysis could be made 
with Kissinger’s analysis of the scientific and technological global dynamics: 
once upon a time the West led and other nations “[…] fall behind 
technologically. This period has now ended” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 364). 
Kissinger (2014, p. 364) goes a little farther:  
The rest of the world is pursuing science and technology [...] 
with perhaps more energy and flexibility than the West, at least 
in countries like China and the “Asian tigers.” 
In sum: in “the world of geopolitics” there is a “turning point” 
(KISSINGER, 2014, p. 364). This analysis of global science and technology 
is preceded by a broad discussion of global regions, which helps to 
understand the nature of the current hegemonic transition: “[…] the nature of 
the emerging world order is itself in dispute” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 93). The 
U.S. and China are “[…] both indispensable pillars of world order,” but both 
experience now unprecedented challenges (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 226). 
Neither the U.S. nor China “[…] is in a position to fill itself the world 
leadership role of the sort the U.S. occupied in the immediate post-Cold War 
period” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 232). While the “[…] nature of the emerging 
world order is itself in dispute,” it “[…] is not simply a multipolarity of power 
but a world of increasingly contradictory realities” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 
365). One major cause of “[…] an international order’s crisis is when it 
proves unable to accommodate a major change in power relations” 
(KISSINGER, 2014, p. 366), a challenge that, according to Kissinger, 
Germany posed in the twentieth century in Europe, and “[…] [t]he 
emergence of China poses a comparable structural challenge in the twenty- 
-first century” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 367). This is the background to a 
discussion of what is lacking in the twenty-first century world order: 
organization of states, political and economic organizations of the world that 
are “at variance with each other”, as “[…] the international economic system 
has become global, while the political structure has remained based on the 
nation-state” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 368), “[…] absence of an effective 
mechanism for great powers to consult and cooperate,” and the American 
leadership as “indispensable” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 370). The conclusion 
is: “[a] reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge to 
statesmanship in our time” (KISSINGER, 2014, p. 371).  
For the argument of this paper, those analyses are informed and useful 
evidence that there are no impending structural reforms in the short-term 
agenda of key actors of the contemporary global capitalist order. Kissinger’s 
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analysis may help to understand why there are no structural reforms in the 
short-term political agenda now — the nature of this transition and 
associated geopolitical problems may be postponing the real talks necessary 
to deal with the post-crisis scenario. 
It is amazing how limited the proposals for “structural reforms” by 
leading figures of the “establishment” have been (see, as good examples, 
Summers (2014) and Bank for International Settlements (2014)). There 
seem to be more complaints about the lack of structural reforms than 
proposals about them. And the return to “business as usual” seems to be 
also strong, with structural reforms meaning “more of the same” — the old 
neoliberal agenda. This is captured even by writers such as Martin Wolf 
(2014a, p. 351), with his diagnosis of “failures of Western elites”. 
One further question, as a consequence of this evaluation of the limits 
of “Western elites” in leading real structural reforms: what are the factors that 
block this capability to implement reforms in global capitalism? Probably 
there is a sort of vicious cycle operating here. Given the level of 
internationalization of production, finance and even of science and 
technology, one key component for the elaboration of those structural 
reforms should be international cooperation among relevant actors. Without 
this international coordination, probably it will not be possible to elaborate 
the necessary long-term response.  
This lack of structural reforms to overcome institutional mismatches — 
presented in sections 2 and 3 — is a key element to tentatively conclude an 
evaluation of the current transition towards a new phase of capitalism: this is 
the blocking (and missing) link of the sequence that connects crises to new 
phases of capitalism. This key element becomes a crucial component to an 
evaluation of the present international conjuncture — “there’s the rub.” 
 
4 Towards a new phase? 
 
The pre-crisis capitalism is gone, but the complete framework of a new 
one is not yet in sight. Section 3 indicates the lack of structural reforms in the 
post-crisis agenda. The international scenario — with the international 
mismatch between internationalization of capital and international 
governance in the background — might be still a blocking factor for the 
elaboration, coordination and implementation of those reforms. The present 
conjuncture can also be the beginning of a learning process of global elites 
to shape this new agenda. 
However, this hole in the sequence crisis-rescue operations-structural 
reforms-new phase does not block further (unintended) steps away from the 
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last variety of capitalism. Of course a return to solutions based on one single 
(even the new leading) national state is not possible. The reason for this is 
the level of internationalization already achieved — interdependence does 
not take a step backwards.  
The end result of this preliminary analysis is that, on the one hand 
inherent dynamics of capital and unintended consequences of post-crisis 
rescue operations are shaping elements of a new phase, but, on the other 
hand, the lack of structural reforms — similar to New Deal in 1929 post-        
-crisis — shows, that until now, the planned and intended elements for a new 
phase are not shaping the new phase.7 Over time this is a key element that 
may change, as elites’ learning process goes ahead — or new surges in 
economic and political crises push them to act. 
The resulting conjuncture probably is best defined by Arrighi’s concept 
of “systemic turbulence” (ARRIGHI, 1994) — a period that may be long, 
when this transition takes place — remember that the last transition took 75 
years to conclude (1870-1945). This puts forward a new issue: what are the 
specificities of this current “systemic transition”? At least three specificities 
may be identified. First, given the level of internationalization of the 
economy, Arrighi’s sequence of leading nation-states may be over. The next 
hegemon may be at least a coordination of nation-states, not a single one, a 
more globalized hegemon — this could be one way to solve the mismatch 
between internationalization of the economy and the lack of international 
governance. Second, recent technological progress combined with the 
internationalization of capital and its power to shape a new international 
division of labor might give room to another new possibility of systemic 
transition, breaking Arrighi’s classic sequence. With the intensification of the 
“technological application of science,” it could be possible to think of a 
division between a country that is the “world’s workshop” and another that is 
the “world’s laboratory” — therefore the sequence would not be only 
between a “world’s workshop” and “world’s bank”, as in previous transitions. 
The process of labor repositioning, now with its polarization between 
intellectual labor and manual labor at global scale, might open room for the 
U.S., Europe and Japan to preserve their position as the “world’s laboratory,” 
while the world’s workshop stays in East Asia — certainly a more complex 
route, but an example of new possibilities for this transition. Third, the global 
capitalist economy is more heterogeneous today — the end of the USSR 
and the rise of capitalist China combine a globalized economy with more 
varieties of capitalism (KING; SZELÉNYI, 2005). Fourth, this increased 
heterogeneity involves a more intra-differentiated periphery that, for 
                                                     
7
 Of course, structural reforms will trigger unintended consequences of their actions. 
Transition towards a new phase?...                                                                                                               319 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 37, n. 1, p. 305-324, Jun. 2016 
example, is headquarter of a growing number of global firms (SILVA, 2014), 
a process that might be already influencing the current reconfiguration of 
capitalism — a “boomerang effect” might be taking place now (MARQUES, 
2014). But this is the subject of another working paper. 
Those specificities of the current “systemic turbulence” indicate the 
need of further research — and the limits of analogies with past transitions to 
the understanding of contemporary capitalism. 
On the one hand, the eventual exhaustion of hegemonic energies of the 
U.S. must be evaluated. If the U.S. hegemony may be divided in two phases, 
it might be understood that the Cold War was very functional for the U.S. 
leadership — at that time the U.S. had no condition to lead the whole world. 
After the end of the Cold War, with the inclusion of Russia, Eastern 
European countries and China in global capitalism, the limits of the U.S. 
leadership capabilities began to surface. Overburden of success? Imposing 
capitalism everywhere — the making of global capitalism, to mention Panitch 
and Gindin (2012) — demands a lot of additional energy to answer new 
issues, for instance, what variety of capitalism should develop in Russia and 
China? The influence on this might be beyond the present capabilities of the 
U.S. Without resources for those new global tasks, after previous successes, 
the U.S. should search for a requalification of its leadership, and therefore 
the present restructuring of global order. 
On the other hand, given the long transition — the last hegemonic 
transition lasted for 73 years — it may be enough for contemporary analysis 
to discuss an eventual “tentative and provisional transition settlement”: a 
“symbiotic relationship” between the U.S. and China — a negotiated 
stalemate? In this “symbiotic relationship,” both the U.S. and China assume 
their mutual dependence, but elements of the center-periphery divide might 
be there: China is poised for the leading position in GDP, but the U.S. retains 
a GDP per capita five times larger; China is the world’s workshop, but the 
U.S. is the laboratory of the world; China has the largest global reserves, but 
those reserves are in U.S. government bonds and dollars. This “symbiotic 
relationship,” being a symbiosis across the center-periphery divide, would be 
in itself a very specific and distinctive feature of the current hegemonic 
transition. If this diagnosis makes sense, the next question should be how 
long this “symbiotic relationship” might last. 
Finally, the internationalization of capital as the “dominant factor” in the 
current transition puts forward an important change in the framework within 
which takes place the struggle between the tendencies and 
countertendencies to the fall of the profit rate. Now, as capitalism involves 
the whole world — not anymore a world with a lot of non-capitalist areas, as 
during the life of Rosa Luxemburg —, there is less space for escaping capital 
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towards areas where the competition may be less intense. One result of this 
integration is the globalization of intercapitalist competition: capital seeking 
new areas in which profit rates would be higher will increasingly be faced by 
other capitals that also seek such outlets, including local capitals — that 
might be looking for outlets elsewhere. This may be an important structural 
change already in operation — see, for instance, the perspectives of 
(premature?) automation in Foxconn Chinese factories (THE THIRD…, 
2014, p. 12).  
In sum, the present conjuncture may be in a learning phase for global 
“elites,” to define a set of structural reforms that would lead to a new variety 
of capitalism. Of course, for the working classes, social and popular 
movements, it is high time to elaborate alternatives to capitalism, an 
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